Difference between revisions of "Transportation Interval Situations and Related Games"
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Latest revision as of 06:44, 30 July 2019
by: Mehmet Onur Olgun, Osman Palanci, Sırma Zeynep Alparslan Gok, Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber
Introduction
• In many situations, producers and retailers are aiming to minimize their costs or maximizing their profits.
• Producers and retailers can form coalitions in order to obtain/save as much as possible. Constitutively, a transportation situation consists of two sets of agents called producers and retailers which produce/demand goods. The transport of the goods from the producers to the retailers has to be profitable.
• Therefore, the main objective is to transport the goods from the producers to the retailers at maximum profit (Aparicio et al. (2010)). Such a cooperation can occur in transportation situations (Sanchez Soriano et al. (2001, 2006)). However, when the agents involved agree on a coalition, the question of distributing the obtained benefit or costs among the agents arises.
• Cooperative game theory is widely used on interesting sharing cost/profit problems in the areas Operations Research such as connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory, transportation situations (Borm et al. (2001)).
Link to material: http://ifors.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Aveiro-2016-Disaster-Mangement-2-Transportation-Games.pdf
